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ABSTRACT
In this review, we provide a brief retrospective history of the science of animal welfare and recognize the 
sentience of non-human animals; however, we emphasize that crucial problems remain regarding how to define 
and measure animal welfare. In general, the use of physiological measures to assess welfare is discouraged. 
Furthermore, there is a theoretical background for measures of stress, but not for welfare states because life 
may not be at risk. Instead, a preference or choice-based approach, which is based on the animal decision, is 
recommended. To this end, welfare is discussed and then contrasted with disease, health, stress and distress. 
In addition, the importance of prospective capacities for the welfare of human and non-human animals is 
discussed.
Keywords: Welfare, well-being, preference, choice, stress, distress, disease, health.
RESUmO
BEm-ESTAR ANImAL: DOS CONCEITOS À REALIDADE. Após uma breve retrospectiva 
histórica da ciência do bem-estar animal, neste artigo reconhecemos a senciência em animais não-humanos; 
mas enfatizamos que problemas crucias permanecem para definirmos e medirmos o bem-estar animal. 
Desencorajamos o uso de medidas fisiológicas para avaliar bem-estar. Argumentamos que há substrato teórico 
suficiente para tais padrões no caso do estresse, mas não no caso do bem-estar, porque neste caso a vida pode 
não estar em risco. Em contrapartida, defendemos uma abordagem baseada na preferência ou escolha dos 
animais, a qual baseia-se na decisão do animal. Para tanto, o bem-estar é discutido e, então, contrastado com 
doença, saúde, estresse e distresse. Além disso, a importância de capacidades prospectivas é discutida em 
relação ao bem-estar de animais humanos e não-humanos.
Palavras-chave: Bem-estar, preferência, escolha, estresse, distresse, doença, saúde.
RESUmEN
BIENESTAR ANImAL: DE LOS CONCEPTOS A LA REALIDAD. Después de una breve retrospectiva 
histórica de la ciencia del bienestar animal, en este artículo reconocemos la capacidad de sentir en animales 
no-humanos; pero enfatizamos que un problema crucial aun persiste al definir y medir el bienestar animal. 
Desalentamos el uso de medidas fisiológicas para evaluar el bienestar. Argumentamos que hay bases teóricas 
suficientes para tales patrones en el caso del estrés, pero no en el caso del bienestar, porque en este caso la vida 
puede no estar en riesgo. En contrapartida, defendemos un abordaje basado en la preferencia o escogencia de los 
animales, la cual está basada en la decisión del animal. Por tal razón, el bienestar es discutido y contrastado con 
enfermedad, salud, estrés y destres. Además de esto, la importancia de capacidades prospectivas es discutida 
en relación al bienestar de animales humanos y no-humanos.
Palabras clave: Bienestar, preferencia, escogencia, estrés, destres, enfermedad, salud.
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INTRODUCTION
Animal welfare is an important current issue in 
biological sciences. A quick web-based search in 
ISI (Institute for Scientific Information) shows a 
clear picture of the growing interest in research that 
includes either ‘animal welfare’ or ‘animal well-
being’ in the topic of the publication. This search 
revealed the following number of all document 
types for each period: 1940s = 2; 1950s = 4; 1960s 
= 8; 1970s = 64; 1980s = 296; 1990s = 1,167; and 
from 2000 to 2008 (October) = 2,715. Thus, this 
rapidly growing interest is considered in the light 
of the brief historical background presented below. 
From this point, the usual topics are considered, but 
approached differently, in the context of the science 
of animal welfare, and contrasting welfare and well-
being with other well-known states (disease, health, 
stress and distress). Attempts to characterize states of 
welfare and well-being in physiological terms are not 
realistic. Finally, we reinforce the preference or choice 
definition of welfare and discuss the time perspective 
(prospective analysis) to the welfare issue.
A BRIEF RETROSPECTIvE HISTORy OF 
THE ANImAL WELFARE ISSUE
The welfare issue emerged as a consequence 
of humans and non-human animal interactions. 
Non-human animals are here considered as sentient 
beings, i.e., conscious organisms that feel such 
perceptions as cold, pain and fear. If animals were 
not sentient, like a machine, welfare considerations 
would not make sense. Despite the views that 
sentience is expected for these animals from everyday 
contact with them, such an assumption was not 
accepted until recently because of some conceptual 
frameworks that evolved over the course of science 
history. In this review, we provide a brief description 
of this history, adapted from Wemelsfelder (1997), 
Jennings (1998), Conte (2004), Dawkins (2006) and 
Duncan (2006). 
During the Renaissance, emotions in non-human 
animals were accepted by artists such as Leonardo 
da Vinci, Thomas More, Shakespeare, and Francis 
Bacon, and also by the general population. Still, in 
the 17th Century, an idea that complicated considering 
non-human animals as suffering beings was Descartes’ 
view, in which animals have no emotions or feelings, 
like automatons. This view derived from Descartes’ 
assumption that the brain and mind were composed 
of two distinct entities, with the mind attributed only 
to human beings. The prevalent religious views at 
the time also contributed to acceptance of this idea, 
possibly because it reinforced the belief that man was 
created in the image of God. In the 18th century, the 
Enlightenment Period, Descartes’ assumption was 
questioned and the possibility of animals experiencing 
pain and suffering was proposed by academics such as 
David Hume and Jeremy Bentham. Daily contact of 
humans with domestic animals (e.g., dogs, cats, and 
horses) also might have contributed to acceptance of 
emotions in non-human animals (at least in vertebrates 
closely related to man).
In 1839, the English veterinarian youatt considered 
that non-human animals had emotions, consciousness, 
memory, associated ideas and reason, and that 
the difference from human beings was in terms of 
degree, and not the sort of emotions experienced 
(Duncan 2006). The gradual acceptance of Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory led to a more rational argument 
being added to the discussion of emotions in animals. 
This theory proposed certain evolutionary continuity 
among organisms, thus conceptualizing man as only 
another species and not as a special product of God’s 
creation. Accordingly, subjective feelings were 
expected as adaptations to natural selective pressures.
The consequence of Darwin’s evolutionary 
concepts with regard to the body-mind problem, 
however, was strong criticism along with the advent 
of Behaviorism in the 20th century. Watson founded 
Behaviorism and stated that a behaviorist should 
abolish all medieval concepts and drop all subjective 
terms such as sensation, perception, thinking and 
emotion. This theory, similar to that of Descartes, 
proposed that animal behavior patterns could be 
explained entirely in terms of stimulus-response 
mechanics; it is likely that this view encouraged 
treatment of animals without regard for their welfare. 
Resistance to accepting that animals have feelings 
also was evident in Ethology, which limited such 
considerations to observed behaviors, although 
ethologists usually refers to “hunger”, “pain”, “fear” 
and “frustration”, among other terms.
According to Millman et al. (2004), the First 
World War shifted the attention of the human 
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community, so that discussions about animal welfare 
were not resumed again until the 1950s. Moreover, 
this probably was a result of the increased marketing 
of domestic livestock and the rise of humanitarian 
organizations against animal suffering in biomedical 
research and food industries. These entities, mainly 
from the USA, also influenced the passing of both the 
Humane Slaughter Act (1958), aimed at protecting 
animals during slaughter, and the Animal Welfare Act 
(1966), protecting animals used in scientific research 
(Millman et al. 2004).
The science of animal welfare has grown gradually 
since the 1960s (Duncan 2006). In this decade, there 
was a consensus that animal welfare was linked to stress 
(the physiological response to stressors) (Bareham 
1972, Wood-Gush et al. 1975, Freeman 1978; all cited 
in Duncan 2006). Accordingly, stressed animals were 
under “poor” welfare conditions while non-stressed 
animals were under “good” welfare conditions, which 
assumed that reliable stress indicators were sufficient 
to allow identification of state of animal welfare.
However, after the publication of ‘Animal 
Machine’ by Ruth Harrison in 1964 (Duncan 2006), 
followed by British government investigations as 
reported in the ‘Brambell Report’ (Brambell 1965), 
studies on animal welfare were redirected. Harrison 
wrote his famous book to highlight the suffering of 
animals submitted to poor conditions in intensive 
culture, biological studies, and product testing (Duncan 
2006). Harrison was intrigued by the possibility that 
such animals could be physiologically stressed and 
possess a degree of consciousness about the suffered 
stress. In the same period, the Brambell Committee 
also defended the idea that ‘sentience’ (a minimum 
level of consciousness) was an essential condition for 
concerns about the welfare of non-human animals.
Since the early 1980s, behavioral scientists 
have accepted the idea that animal feelings are 
important to the welfare issue. In the 1990s, because 
of increasing world animal production, studies 
on welfare and related subjects (pain, suffering, 
consciousness) were dramatically increased. The 
interest in animal welfare has encouraged some 
companies to establish criteria for handling animals 
destined for consumption (Fraser 1995), although not 
necessarily based on scientific principles. Of course, 
it also may have been a marketing program to reach 
customers increasingly sensitive to animal welfare. 
In the scientific environment, ethics committees 
have been established in most countries to dictate 
local guidelines for acceptable ways of dealing 
with animals (for production, experimentation, 
and recreation purposes). Scientific journals also 
increasingly have required that authors certify that 
their studies are in accordance with at least local 
ethics committees, although some journals still use 
their own ethical guidelines.
In the present century, the debate intensified and 
several reviews appeared, including dozens with 
‘animal welfare’ or ‘animal well-being’ in the title. 
Some recent conceptual reviews on animal welfare 
are Dawkins (2006), Duncan (2006), Volpato et al. 
(2007), Bekoff (2008), Broom (2008), Camfield & 
Skevington (2008), Dawkins (2008), Fraser (2008), 
Gómez-Laplaza & Gil-Carnicero (2008), Hogan & 
Phillips (2008), Mendl & Paul (2008), Passantino 
(2008), Takahashi-Omoe & Omoe (2008), Veissier 
& Forkman (2008), Yeats & Main (2008).
The possibility of animal feelings, an important 
focus of the welfare issue, has been a challenge to 
scientists to prove that non-human animals (mostly 
vertebrates) are sentient beings and thus deserve 
welfare considerations. Opposite positions, however, 
still consider non-human animals as non-sentient 
beings (see Rose 2002 for fish) and a reverse onus 
clause has been used (thus shifting the burden of proof 
to the scientist). We propose that if any doubt still 
exists in this matter, the burden of the proof should 
be on those that defend the position that animals are 
not sentient beings. However, several scientists have 
accepted this reverse onus clause, probably because 
of their intrinsic motivation for solving complex 
questions. Volpato et al. (2007) analyzed the logic 
of such debates and concluded that empirical 
science can neither prove nor disprove sentience in 
non-human animals; however, the authors consider 
that current data (morphological, physiological 
and behavioral) and theories are suggestive of 
feeling in such organisms, creating a scenario 
ethically tempered in favor of assuming non-human 
animals as sentient beings, thus deserving welfare 
considerations (and in case of doubt, assuming that 
they are sentient beings). Therefore, the important 
question remaining is not about sentience, but how 
to know when animals are experiencing conditions 
that affect their welfare.
8 VOLPATO, G.L. et al.
Oecol. Bras., 13(1): 05-15, 2009
WELFARE AND WELL-BEING
Although these words have been usually used 
almost interchangeably, their implications to 
considerations of animal suffering might be relevant. 
According to Broom (2008, p. 81), “In origin, 
welfare refers to how the individual is faring or going 
through life whilst well-being is how the individual 
is ... Welfare is the word used in modern European 
legislation.” Immediate conditions acting upon an 
organism are mostly concerned with that state of well-
being, while an animal’s growing history is related to 
welfare. For instance, a sick condition on only one day 
is more relevant to well-being than to welfare, and its 
permanence is undoubtedly associated with welfare.
Although the welfare issue encompasses 
organisms in wild and captive conditions, the main 
focus of the welfare issue is captive animals. Animals 
used in production systems for food, for instance, are 
clearly expected to have short lifetime. The welfare 
consideration in this context is about how they exist 
during their relatively short life span. To know how 
these organisms are faring through life (welfare) is 
obviously important, as also it is to know how they 
are faring at the moment (well-being). The important 
question, however, is to know how to assess the well-
being of non-human animals.
INTERACTION OF WELL-BEING WITH 
OTHER BIOLOGICAL STATES
Disease, health, stress and distress should be 
considered in animal welfare. Understanding the 
links between these states is essential for a broad 
conceptualization of well-being and welfare. In Figure 
1, these connections are schematized in terms of set 
theory. Accordingly, well-being does not include 
disease states and not all health conditions mean well-
being; stress and distress may be included in disease, 
health or well-being states. In the following examples, 
arguments for these relationships are presented. 
DISEASE AND WELL-BEING
Although no one doubts that a sick animal is not 
in good condition, there are reasonable arguments 
contradicting that well-being includes disease states. 
Sickness impairs life, changes normal behavior, 
causes discomfort or even suffering. Sickness often 
precedes death and is the consequence of many 
aggressions upon the organism, e.g. viral, bacterial 
and parasite infections, pollution, and metabolic or 
immunologic or genetically-mediated diseases. To 
find conditions where a sick state is favorable to the 
organism appears to be a hard challenge.
We can imagine, for instance, that some disease 
conditions in humans could be maintained to provide 
the sick person psychological attention that could not 
be attracted otherwise. Such a state could imply a 
condition of well-being for that individual. That is, 
the disease state is a social mechanism for attracting 
attention and care. However, as far as we know, this 
example has no correlates in the non-human animal 
world, and thus, we cannot use it to make any general 
conclusion even restricted to vertebrates. This 
example seems more an exception for humans than 
part of a general rule, at least while its occurrence is 
not demonstrated in non-human animals.
HEALtH AND WELL-BEING
The assumption that all healthy animals are in 
a condition of well-being ignores some physical or 
psychological discomforts that might impair life 
quality. For instance, fear, anxiety, tiredness, thirst, 
hunger and lack of protection are some conditions 
that may cause discomfort, and even stress, in healthy 
animals. As Bekoff (2008) points out, even ‘good’ 
welfare is not ‘good enough’, since the animals’ 
feelings may not be taken into account. Thus, the 
real question remaining is how exactly we should 
characterize the welfare or well-being states of 
healthy non-human animals.
StRESS AND WELL-BEING
The success of the welfare issue in scientific 
debate in recent years caused many studies to shift the 
state of “non-stress” to “welfare”, including the use 
of physiological indicators of stress for assessment 
of welfare. However, our view of current knowledge 
supports that stress may be part of disease, health and 
well-being states, and thus is not a reliable indicator 
of just the disease state (see Figure 1).
 Stress originally was defined as the challenge of 
the relative stability of the internal state by an aversive 
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stimulus (Selye 1936). During such a challenge, the 
sympathetic nervous system and the hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (hypothalamus-
pituitary-interrenal in fish) become activated in 
vertebrates, thus resulting in increased blood levels 
of cathecolamines and corticosteroids, respectively 
(Moberg 1999, Mommsen et al. 1999, Barton 2002). 
These physiological changes, and release of other 
chemical intermediates (e.g., corticotrophin-releasing 
hormone and adrenocorticotrophic hormone), have 
been successfully measured as indicators of stress in 
vertebrates.
Since stress ingenuously was considered to 
be an impaired condition of the organism, some 
researchers still view stress as the opposite of well-
being. However, this clearly is not the case. In fact, 
stress is a natural response that enables the animal to 
cope with aversive or potentially threatening or lethal 
stimuli, thus overcoming the unfavorable condition 
and allowing rapid recovery to the pre-stress state. 
Thus, stress is a biological, adaptive mechanism 
evolutionarily acquired that has survival value. 
Release of catecholamines and corticosteroids 
mobilize or sustain energy release from reserves, 
which enables the animal to cope with the imposed 
challenge. Importantly, such a coping mechanism is a 
necessary part of life and not necessarily hazardous. 
Increased physiological indicators of stress also 
have been demonstrated in conditions where a threat 
to welfare was not expected. For instance, Roney 
et al. (2007) carried out a comprehensive study on 
endocrine responses of young men to social interaction 
with young women. Their data indicated that cortisol 
increases in a positive social opportunity rather than 
during social threats. The authors assert that cortisol-
mediated energy mobilization may be functional 
for both facilitating courtship and responding to 
threatening events. In migratory fish, increased 
cortisol was found to prime the hippocampus or other 
olfactory areas of the brain to recall memory and, thus, 
allow the fish to find the natal stream in a reproductive 
migration, an example where stress-induced cortisol 
enhances reproductive success (Carruth et al. 2002). 
Greater circulating glucocorticoid levels were 
correlated with greater survival in the European, 
common and side-blotched lizards (Comendant et al. 
2003, Cote et al. 2006), and wild rabbits (Cabezas 
et al. 2007). In mice, prenatal stress improves the 
offspring’s performance in motor tasks in a sex- and 
age-specific way, without increasing anxiety-like 
behavior (Pallarés et al. 2007). Duncko et al. (2007) 
showed that acute stress improves learning in healthy 
men. Moreover, if these natural conditions that 
demand energy and impose stress are not part of the 
welfare state of a species, then how could one justify 
the role of these conditions to survival and evolution? 
A parsimonious answer is that stress, in such cases, 
does not mean impaired condition (see also Breuner 
et al. 2008 and the allostatic theory from McEwen & 
Wingfield 2003).
Figure 1. Body states represented by set theory. Consider intersections among subsets instead of areas. Accordingly, health does not include disease; 
stress does not include distress; disease may include both stress and distress; well-being does not include disease, but instead may include stress and 
distress; well-being is part, but not the whole, of a health state.
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DIStRESS AND WELL-BEING
Under more stressful conditions, the organism 
may reach the distress state. Distress, as clearly 
defined in Moberg (1999), is the internal state when 
an over-challenged organism needs extra energy, 
thus, impairing some other biological function (e.g., 
reproduction, growth and/or immunological defense). 
However, we defend that even this strong energy-cost 
challenge may be part of the welfare condition in some 
circumstances. Migration is one of the best examples. 
Migration consumes energy reserve extensively (see 
Butler et al. 1998, Shmueli et al. 2000, Tudorache et 
al. 2008) and one expects that a healthy, fit migratory 
animal would be successfully engaged in this difficult 
journey. Migration evolved as a strategy to maximize 
fitness in many organisms and is part of their life 
history. Even if given the choice, animals will 
migrate, since they are genetically destined to do so. 
Fights to defend territories, food, females or offspring 
also can be interpreted in this same way, causing even 
distress, although the genetic drivers might be less 
well expressed in some cases. Why do we suspect that 
these naturally predictable behaviors or states are not 
a part of an organism’s welfare condition? We state 
that there is no biological basis for such a suspicion, 
except for an anthropomorphic view.
DEFINING WELFARE AND WELL-BEING
As we have proposed, the relationships shown in 
Figure 1 are naturally expected and from this view 
emerges the need to clearly define the states of well-
being. To answer this question, we will summarize the 
main tenets in the literature and some less explored 
proposals.
PHySIOLOGICAL INDICAtORS
Most scientists are immersed in studies to find 
physiological and behavioral patterns that indicate 
the welfare or well-being states in animals. Part of 
this aim is derived from the human search for general 
patterns (also a goal in science), and partly because of 
successfully finding physiological patterns associated 
with the stress phenomenon as delineated by Hans 
Selye (1936). We have supported that such a goal is 
feasible, but not completely valid for welfare or well-
being considerations (Volpato et al. 2007). Therefore, 
we will discuss this position in more detail.
Stress responses provide the organism energy for 
coping with stressors. During biological evolution, 
organisms were subjected continually to stressors, and 
survival was somewhat conditioned by the availability 
of energy to support the necessary responses. Thus, 
it is reasonable that evolution shaped physiological 
mechanisms to a standardized pattern. This is true for 
vertebrates, the most studied organisms in this field. 
Similar mechanisms designed to provide energy are, 
thus, highly expected in other animal organisms. 
In this adaptive approach, stress enables life 
and, paradoxically, extremes of this system can be 
hazardous (distress as defined by Moberg 1999). 
Thus, distress mechanisms, instead of a providing 
negative feedback to stop excessive stress, evolved, 
which has to be explained in terms of natural selection. 
One tentative explanation is that distress is also under 
selection, where an individual that faces distress 
more frequently will be prevented from reproducing. 
Excessive exposure to overly stressful conditions that 
cause distress may be a consequence of non-adaptive 
environment-animal interactions guided by specific 
systems (nervous system primarily) for evaluating 
cues and conditions. Although just a speculative 
explanation, the physiological mechanisms of distress 
as well as stress exist, thus indicating that some 
positive selective pressure acted upon both.
At this point, we support that evolutionary 
mechanisms have shaped responses to stress and 
distress, and thus the search for physiological patterns 
of these processes is highly expected. By analogy, are 
there physiological mechanisms shaped by evolution 
for the welfare and well-being states?
The answer to this question is no and the reason 
is easily explained. A trait should have clear 
consequences for survival and/or reproduction so that 
it can be shaped by natural selection over the course 
of evolution. This is the case with stress, and perhaps 
distress, but there is no such profile for the welfare 
and well-being states. As shown in Figure 1, only 
sick animals surely are not in a condition of well-
being, thus they could not be selected evolutionarily. 
Under good states, neither survival nor reproduction 
is at risk and thus natural selection is not expected to 
shape some physiological “pattern”. Either high and 
low demanding conditions (systems) are expected for 
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well-being or welfare states, which are different from 
the stress-demanding states. Even animals in poor 
welfare states might have improved fitness (e.g., see 
Breuner et al. 2008). Considering that a clear point 
for selection is not found for welfare and well-being 
states, physiological pathways strictly related to 
these states are not expected, and thus the consequent 
physiological indicators are improbable.
NAtuRAL BEHAVIOR
Several authors have suggested expression of 
‘natural behavior’ to indicate welfare or well-being 
states (see Huntingford et al. 2006). This logic, 
however, needs caution and is a common approach by 
veterinarians and people in zoos caring for domestic or 
wild animals. However, what is considered a ‘natural 
behavior’? Basically, it is the behavior expressed 
by the animal in nature. This assumes that animals 
in nature are all in good condition, which is not 
necessarily true. In the natural behavior’s approach, 
expression of unnatural behaviors is accepted as an 
indicator of poor state.
When canaries (Serinus canaria) deprived of 
nest material go through the motions of weaving 
material into a non-existent nest, this is said to be 
“vacuum behavior” (McFarland 2006). This is 
clearly a non-natural behavior that indicates the 
animal is not in a good state (in this case, deprived 
of nest material while physiologically motivated 
for nesting). A dog or a cat may lick or scratch 
its leg to the point that it hurts itself; this is not a 
naturally expected behavior, since it can impair the 
animal’s health. Clearly, this behavior is indicative 
that the animal is not in a good state. Although 
such behaviors may also occur in nature (some 
psychological disorders are expected even in natural 
life), they do not indicate state of welfare, but rather 
absence of good condition. Some prisoners at the 
Alcatraz prison could even paint pictures, play 
music and enjoy some other “privileges”, and even 
unnatural (abnormal) behavior could not be detected 
under these circumstances, but this certainly does 
not mean the prisoners were in good states (at least 
psychologically). For some captive animals, the 
analogy might be valid. In short, natural behaviors 
do not warrant welfare as well as well-being states, 
and unnatural behavior might indicate the animal is 
not in good condition. Thus, the question of how to 
differentiate a healthy animal from a healthy animal 
in good state remains unanswered.
StEREOtyPED BEHAVIOR
Stereotypies, also a behavior displayed under 
extreme conditions, are usually accepted for indicating 
poor welfare (see in Dawkins 2008), but this seems 
to be not the case. For instance, in mink, stereotypy 
occurs in animals with low cortisol levels (Bildsøe et 
al. 1991) but also in those showing better reproductive 
performance (Jeppesen et al. 2004). Hansen et al. 
(2006) could not associate stereotypy with either 
fearful and anticipation behavior – both indicating 
welfare. Moreover, De Passillé et al. (1993) reported 
that stereotypies in calves might even be beneficial. 
Therefore, Dawkins (2008) argues that the welfare 
implications of stereotypy is not in terms of whether 
stereotypy is a reliable measure of welfare, but rather 
whether this behavior is good for health and/or what 
the animal wants to do. Therefore, stereotypy is not a 
good welfare indicator. 
CHOICE AND PREFERENCE
Some authors have used preference or choice 
tests to learn more about non-human animals, and 
use these preferences or choices to offer animals 
better conditions in an attempt to reach good states 
(see reviews in Dawkins 2006, Volpato et al. 2007 
and Dawkins 2008). In this way, Dawkins (2006) has 
reinforced this approach with regard to the welfare 
issue. Volpato et al. (2007) engaged this approach 
and proposed a preference-based definition for fish 
welfare (mainly well-being), which is valid for any 
other animal. Accordingly, welfare is “… the internal 
state of a fish when it remains under conditions that 
were freely chosen” (Volpato et al. 2007). In this 
review, these authors also detailed methodological 
concerns for applying such preference tests.
Here, we still emphasize this preference or choice 
approach for understanding what the animal wants. 
More recently, Dawkins (2008) again elegantly 
reinforced two important questions for approaching 
animal welfare: 1) Are the animals healthy? 2) Do 
they have what they want? In short, Dawkins (2008, 
p. 943) defines good welfare as “healthy animals 
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that have what they want”. The inclusion of “health” 
in the definition presented by Volpato et al. (2007) 
is interesting and also is represented in Figure 1. 
However, some concerns must be addressed with 
respect to the recent Dawkins’ approach. First is the 
definition of ‘animal needs’. According to McFarland 
(2006), ‘needs’ are conditions that are essential for 
the animal’s survival (e.g., foraging for food and 
feeding for survival), while ‘wants’ are motivated 
behaviors not necessary for individual survival, but 
may be necessary for species survival (e.g., sexual 
behavior). Therefore, the choice or preference 
approach is implicated mostly in ‘wants’ rather than 
‘needs’, since ‘wants’ refers to a broader spectrum of 
behaviors and conditions (even including ‘needs’). 
In our research group, we have dedicated a 
number of experiments to build a comprehensive 
catalog of ‘wants’ for one fish species, the Nile tilapia 
(Oreochromis niloticus). Although just an animal 
model, we have found interesting results, mostly that 
its ‘wants’ are not necessarily those that have been 
used in fisheries. More studies are needed, but this 
approach will enable us to calculate the welfare/well-
being imposed cost for production, a subject that 
should underlie discussions on animal welfare.
WELL-BEING AND WELFARE, AGAIN!
While welfare is the updated word for guidelines, 
laws, and regulations, scientists are closer to the 
notion of well-being states. We can better study 
what the animals want (see also Dawkins 2008), a 
state more related to the well-being of an individual. 
From this perspective, if a captive animal’s wants are 
available, we suppose they are in better well-being 
condition (even they should choose not to be confined 
– this is a nonsensical scenario in the welfare issue). 
Therefore, considering that humans will maintain 
animal production, well-being can easily be taken into 
account from preference/choice tests, thus possibly 
assuring welfare conditions.
tIME PERSPECtIVE FOR WELFARE 
CONSIDERAtIONS
What an animal experiences during everyday 
life might have immediate consequences and also 
may affect future outcomes. Such differentiation 
is important for welfare considerations. An animal 
engaged in a reproductive migration (an ultimate-
based behavior) is subjected to daily high-energy 
costs and the journey may result in either death or 
reproduction. Social hierarchy might be disputed 
daily (e.g., proximate causes), but longer-term 
consequences are expected (e.g., obtaining females 
and other resources). Are non-human animals aware 
or conscious of the long-term consequences in both 
examples? In other words, are non-human animals 
prospective beings? Although this might be an 
anthropomorphic view, daily (and also proximate) 
experiences can affect life in both short- and long-
term perspectives. When judging or choosing daily 
acts or conditions, an animal might cope well in the 
short term in an activity that is ultimately not safe for 
its welfare in the long term. In humans, some play 
activity for children or certain addictive behaviors 
might seem beneficial in a short time perspective, but 
hazardous over a longer period. Thus, prospective 
analysis might be imperative for survival.
No one doubts that for longer time considerations, 
mechanisms acquired through evolution warrant 
success. For instance, we assume that when an 
animal migrates for reproduction, this is a heritable 
trait resulting in innate behavior and not a conscious 
journey for reproduction. The genetically-based 
‘prospective behaviors’ are essential for survival. Ants 
save food for winter, bears store energy for winter 
dormancy, and solitary wasps keep anaesthetized 
prey larvae together with their eggs and run away 
forever – a behavior that warrants food for the future 
offspring, for example. Even in everyday situations 
(in the short term), innate drives are important. 
The fish, pacu (Piaractus mesopotamicus), visually 
facing a predator fish keeps away from it and releases 
chemicals that disperse conspecifics, a response 
where experience is not necessary (a supposedly 
innate response) (Jordão & Volpato 2000). The 
carnivorous fish, sorubim pintado (Pseudoplatystoma 
curruscan), stays motionless when smelling a larger-
sized conspecific fish, a potential predator; otherwise, 
it displays feeding search behavior when the smell 
is from a smaller conspecific (a potential prey) 
(Giaquinto & Volpato 2005). During copulation, the 
female sagebrush cricket (Cyphoderris strepitans) 
feeds on a portion of the male wing material and 
consumes haemolymph flowing from the wounds it 
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inflicts (Morris 1979, Dodson et al. 1983, both cited 
in Eggert & Sakaluk 1994). A majority of mantid 
species (Stagomantis spp.) might experience sexual 
cannibalism (the female cannibalizes the male after 
mating), thus making reproduction a dangerous 
period, but males engage in reproduction anyway. 
This ‘courageous’ initiative is obviously a genetically 
determined behavior that all mature males will do 
when facing a mature female. 
However, medical care and advice for human 
health are clearly conscious prospective guidelines. 
Although non-human vertebrates have learned 
(or conscious) prospective behavioral drives, as 
evidenced for example, in time-learning behaviors 
(Barreto et al. 2006, Delicio & Barreto 2008), the 
duration of these drives is obviously very limited 
compared with those in humans. However, for 
welfare concerns, aware or conscious anticipation 
of the future needs to be considered. Mendl & Paul 
(2008) carefully reviewed the question “Do animals 
live in the present?” They show behavioral evidence 
that argues for the capacity to recognize the concept 
of time in non-human animals, and conclude that this 
ability may bring both welfare benefits and problems. 
This emerging area in welfare science still deserves 
more investigation, even though already was referred 
to in the Brambell (1965).
The role of nature and/or nurture on the life of an 
animal may depend on the lifespan: complex processes 
are more expected for longer life span species. Thus, 
this problem is complex and caution is needed, while 
it is a fruitful area for future studies.
CONCLUDING REmARKS
This review highlights topics on the animal welfare 
issue, trying to clarify the scenario (from concepts to 
reality). The main ideas discussed and proposed are:
well-being state is undoubtedly of great importance - 
to the welfare science;
assessing the individual well-being state is the - 
most feasible way to consider the quality of life 
of an organism;
most scientists agrees that a healthy animal is not - 
necessarily in welfare/well-being conditions;
stress and distress are not reliable indicators of - 
well-being states and might even be part of a 
welfare condition;
evolution of clear-cut physiological pathways - 
underlying the well-being/welfare state is highly 
unlike; thus, general physiological indicators of 
welfare, even restricted to a taxonomic group, are 
improbable;
natural and/or stereotyped behavior are discouraged - 
as indicators of animal welfare;
the preference-based approach in the welfare issue - 
is useful because the complex system-environment 
relationship is based on animal decisions;
the general characterization of an internal state of - 
welfare is biologically unexpected, and scientists 
should focus more deeply on what the animals 
want.
The animal welfare issue is complex and 
deserves much caution. In this review, we criticized 
some attempts to view the welfare state from either 
a save-energy approach or from a standardized 
physiological phenomenon. Instead, we propose 
a deep look at the animal wants, in line with 
considerations of the animals’ point of view as 
proposed by Dawkins (2006) and Duncan (2006). 
In this context, to know how the animal behaves 
in a specific environment is undoubtedly necessary, 
and is reached mainly by choice tests. These 
tests, however, could be tempered by cognition 
approaches (see Brydges & Braithwaite 2008). 
Contradictory published data on animal welfare 
reveals the complexity of this issue, a consequence 
of different approaches and definitions, thus surely 
indicating needs for caution. 
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